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THE JURISDICTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
SUPREME COURT
ATWELL CAMPBELL McINTOSH*
I. Organization. When first established, the court was com-
posed of three justices, appointed by the general assembly to hold
office during good behavior; and the justices themselves appointed
one of their number as chief justice.' By the Constitution of 1868
the number was increased to five, a chief justice and four associate
justices, to be elected by popular vote, and to hold office for eight
years and until their successors are qualified.2 By an amendment in
1875 the number was reduced to three, and in 1887 it was again
increased to five, as the court is now constituted.3 The court is thus
made by the Constitution a co6rdinate department of the government
and is not subject to legislative control.3 '
In case of a vacancy, the power of appointment is vested in the
governor to fill such vacancy. The original section of the Constitu-
tion provided for filling the vacancy "until the next regular election,"
and this was construed to mean "the next regular election for that
office"; but this was changed by the amendment of 1875 to the next
regular election for members of the general assembly.4 The ques-
tion then arose as to whether the justice so elected should hold office
for eight years or only for the unexpired term, and it was held that
it should be only for the unexpired term.5
The court is a court of record, and the clerk of the supreme court,
who is appointed by the court for a term of eight years, is required
to keep the records of the court in his office in Raleigh.6 Other offi-
cers appointed by the court are the supreme court reporter, the
marshal and the librarian.7
* Mr. McIntosh is Professor of Law and Acting Dean of the School of
Law of the University of North Carolina. This article forms part of a chapter
on Courts and Jurisdiction for a text book in Civil Procedure in North Caro-
lina, in preparation for the West Publishing Company, St. Paul. It appears
by permission of the publishers.
'Rev. Stats., ch. 33, ss. 1, 5; Rev. Code, ch. 33, ss. 1, 5.
' Const., Art. 4, ss. 6, 21, 25.
' Const., Art. 4, s. 21 ; C. S. 1403, 1404.
' Wilson v. Jordan, 124 N. C. 683, 705, 33 S. E. 139.
'Const., Art. 4, s. 25; Cloud v. Wilson, 72 N. C. 155; Ewart v. Jones, 116
N. C. 570, 21 S. E. 787; Rodwell v. Rowland, 137 N. C. 617, 626, 50 S. E. 319.
'Opinion of Judges, 114 N. C. 923.
'Const., Art. 4, s. 15; C. S. 1406, 1424.
C. S. 1423, 1427, 1428.
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II. Terms of court. Prior to 1868 the court held three terms a
year, two in Raleigh and one in Morganton ;8 but since that date two
terms are held each year, both in Raleigh, commencing on the first
Monday in February and the last Monday in August, and continuing
until the business on the docket is disposed of by hearing or con-
tinuance. If no one of the justices should attend during the first
week of the term, the court will stand adjourned until the next term.9
III. Quorum. Three justices constitute a quorum for the trans-
action of business.10 When only three justices are present, the other
two being absent or failing to take part in the hearing for any cause,
they may proceed with the business, and the opinion of two, the third
dissenting, would be the decision of the court, although less than a
majority of the court. In State v. Lane," when the court was com-
posed of three members, one of the justices died and the other two
rendered the decision and ordered the judge of the lower court to
carry the judgment into execution. The superior court judge re-
fused to proceed because he was of the opinion that two justices
did not constitute the court. On appeal it was held that the two,
being a majority of the court, had authority to proceed.
IV. Original jurisdiction. Prior to 1868, the court had original
exclusive jurisdiction in repealing letters patent.' 2 The present Con-
stitution provides that "the supreme court shall have original juris-
diction to hear claims against the state, but its decisions shall be
merely recommendatory; no process in the nature of execution shall
issue thereon; they shall be reported to the next session of the
general assembly for its action."' 8
It is an established principle of jurisprudence that the sovereign
state cannot be sued without its consent, and it may prescribe the
terms and conditions under which such suits may be brought. So far
as the state courts are concerned, this provision of the Constitution,
with the statutes enacted to carry out its purpose, is the only relax-
ation of the rule as to exemption from suit.' 4
'Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 2.
C. S. 1408.
C. S. 1407.
'26 N. C. 434. This case is interesting because of the fact that Ruffin,
Chief Justice, rendered the opinion of the court, and Pearson, later Chief Jus-
tice, was the superior court judge.
Rev. Stats. ch. 33, s. 6; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 6.
"Const., Art. 4, s. 9; C. S. 1409.
N, Carpenter v. R. R., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693; Blount v. Simmons, 119
N. C. 50, 25 S. E. 789; Martin v. Worth, 91 N. C. 45; Battle v. Thompson, 65
JURISDICTION OF N. C. SUPREME COURT
1. Nature of the jurisdiction. The purpose of the jurisdiction is
to have the court give an opinion upon an important question of law
involved in a particular claim, which may aid the legislature in dis-
posing of it, since it was formerly considered questionable whether
the court, in the exercise of its constitutional duties, could communi-
cate an opinion to the legislature.15 The authority extends only to
deciding upon the legal validity of the claim upon the facts presented
and reporting that decision as a recommendation. No judgment can
be rendered which can be enforced by any process in the nature of an
execution. It is intended to give the claimant an opportunity to have
the legality of his claim passed upon because, the state being a party,
he cannot try the question in the ordinary courts.18 The jurisdiction
thus conferred is exclusive, and cannot be exercised by any other
court, nor by the supreme court on appeal from a lower court.1 7
2. Nature of the claims. The terms used, "claims against the
state," and "any person having any claim against the state,"18 would
seem to embrace claims of every kind, but this meaning has been much
restricted by the construction of the court.
a. Law and fact. The jurisdiction is limited to questions of law
arising upon the facts presented, and does not extend to cases where
only questions of fact are involved. Where the claimant demanded
pay for services rendered as a judge of the superior court, it was
admitted that the service had been performed, but it was denied that
he was entitled to compensation as a judge, the court decided that
the claim was valid and recommended payment.19 So where the
claim for services rendered to the state under a contract which the
state alleged to be invalid or to have been rescinded, the facts having
been admitted or ascertained, the court determined the legal validity
of the claim and recommended payment.20
N. C. 406. As a member of the Federal Union the state may be sued in the
manner authorized by the Const. of U. S., Art. 3, s. 2, and Art. 11. See South
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286.
'"Reynolds v. State, 64 N. C. 460.
"Bain v. State, 86 N. C. 49; Blount 'v. Simmons, 119 N. C. 50, 25 S. E.
789; Dredging Co. v. State, 191 N. C. 243, 132 S. E. 25.
tBattle v. Thompson, 65 N. C. 406; Boner v. Adams, 65 N. C. 639; Martin
v. Worth, 91 N. C. 45; Chemical Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 111 N. C. 135,
15 S. E. 1032; Printing Co. v. Hoey, 124 N. C. 767, 33 S. E. 160; nor can an
action be maintained in the district court of the United States, North Carolina
v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22.
C. S. 1409, 1410.
Henry v. State, 68 N. C. 465.
Clements v. State, 76 N. C. 199; s. c. 77 N. C. 142; Bledsoe v. State, 64
N. C. 392.
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Where the claims were for services rendered or supplies furnished
and the facts were denied, the court declined to investigate thei facts
and held that the claimant's remedy was by application to the legis-
lature.2 1 Where the claimant demanded the return of $50. paid as
license fee to the state, under a law which had been declared uncon-
stitutional by the supreme court of the United States, the court held
that the claim was too small and the question of law too well known
to justify an investigation, and that the claimant should apply for
relief to the legislature.
22
When a claim against the state is sought to be enforced, the
rights of the claimant and the liability of the state may be determined
by the same laws as in the case of private persons; and the state may
plead the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim. 23 But when an
action is brought by the state in the proper court to collect a claim
due the state, the defendant is not allowed to set up a counterclaim,
unless it is in the nature of a set-off or credit growing out of the
original cause. An independent counterclaim is a claim against the
state which can be asserted only in the supreme court.
2 4
b. Relief obtainable in another court. This jurisdiction has been
conferred because the state is the defendant, and if the claim is one
in which the claimant may obtain relief in the regular way in another
court the jurisdiction is not exercised. Where the plaintiff sued in
the supreme court alleging that he was the owner of certain land held
by the Insane Asylum, an agency of the state, and asked the court to
investigate the title and to recommend a purchase by the state, it was
held that since the Insane Asylum was an agency of the state, auth-
orized to sue and be sued, an action might be brought in the ordinary
way in the superior court to try the title. It was further held that
the court could not make the recommendation asked for, since it
could recommend to the legislature only that which in ordinary cases
could be declared by judgment and enforced by execution. 25
c. Claims which may not be paid. Only claims which the legis-
lature is authorized to pay by appropriate legislation under the Con-
stitution may be considered, and not those claims the payment of
'Reynolds v. State, 64 N. C. 460; Reeves v. State, 93 N. C. 257; Dredging
Co. v. State, 191 N. C. 243, 132 S. E. 25.
"Sinclair v. State, 69 N. C. 47. See also Cowles v. State, 115 N. C. 173,
20 S. E. 384; Miller v. State, 134 N. C. 270, 46 S. E. 514.
' Cowles v. State, 115 N. C. 173, 20 S. E. 384.
Battle v. Thompson, 65 N. C. 406.
" Bain v. State, 86 N. C. 49; County Bd. of Education v. State Bd. of
Education, 106 N. C. 81, 10 S. E. 1002.
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which is prohibited, or which must first be submitted to the popular
vote.. This has been held with reference to claims against the state
arising out of the Civil War ;26 and in regard to certain "special tax
bonds" issued during the period of Reconstruction.27
d. Claims arising out of tort. While the state can act only
through its recognized agencies, the wrongful acts of such agents do
not impose any liability upon the state under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, and such claims cannot be considered. A claim was
filed in the supreme court by the plaintiff, alleging that he was a con-
vict in the state prison and was injured by an explosion due to the
negligence of the manager in charge, and it was held that no liability
on the part of the state existed and the claim was dismissed.
2S
Similar actions were brought in the superior court against agencies
of the state for personal injuries growing out of negligence; it was
held that such agencies were not liable to be sued unless expressly
authorized, and if such action could be brought there was no liability
on the part of the state.2 9
e. Costs of action as a claim. While the state may be sued only
in the supreme court, it may sue in any court having jurisdiction over
the cause of action, and the costs of such litigation may be taxed
against the state as in case of private litigants. Such costs, however,
do not constitute a claim against the state as contemplated in the
jurisdiction of the supreme court, but are only incidental to the right
to sue. The court in which the action is brought adjudicates the
costs, and the parties interested should apply to the legislature for
payment.30
3. Procedure. The method of prosecuting claims against the
state is regulated by statute. (a) The claimant must file his com-
plaint in the office of the clerk of the supreme court, setting forth
the nature of his claim. (b) He shall cause a copy of his complaint
to be served upon the governor, at least twenty days before appli-
cation for relief is made to the court, and he shall request the gov-
" Const., Art. 1, s. 6; Rand v. State, 65 N. C. 194, 6 A. R. 741.
Const., Art. 1, s. 6; Home v. State, 82 N. C. 382; s. c. 84 N. C. 362;
Baltser v. State, 104 N. C. 265, 10 S. E. 163; s. c. 109 N. C. 187, 13 S. E. 724;
Cowles v. State, 115 N. C. 173, 20 S. E. 384; North Carolina v. Temple, 134
U. S. 22.
" Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, 41 A. R. 440.
Moody v. State Prison, 128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 131, 53 L. R. A. 855; Car-
penter v. R. R. and Highway Comm., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E 693.
" C. S. 1236; Miller v. State, 134 N. C. 270, 46 S, E. 514; Garner v. Worth,
122 N. C. 250, 29 S. E. 364; Blount v. Simmons, 119 N. C. 50, 25 S. E. 789;
s. c. 120 N. C. 19, 26 S. E. 649.
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ernor to appear for the state and answer the claim. (c) When an
appearance is made for the state and pleadings are filed, the trial
shall be conducted as the court shall direct. (d) If issues of fact
arise upon the pleadings, they are to be transferred to the superior
court of some convenient county to be tried by a jury, and the judge
of such court shall certify the verdict and the case to the next term of
the supreme court. (e) If there is no appearance for the state, the
court may make up issues and send them down for trial. (f) Upon
the final hearing, the court shall report the facts found and their
recommendation thereon to the general assembly.81
While the court will not consider cases in which only matters of
fact are involved, it may be necessary to ascertain the facts upon
which the law is to be declared. This may be done by a jury trial, as
above provided, or by a reference to the clerk to find the facts, or the
court may act upon information before them.82
Upon the decision of the court, the clerk is directed to send a
copy of the complaint and other pleadings, with a copy of the find-
ings and the decision of the court, to the governor, to be by him
communicated to the general assembly. 3
4. Effect of decision. The decision of the court is not a final
determination of the claim which may be enforced as a judgment,
but is only a recommendation, to be accepted or not in the discretion
of the general assembly. No process in the nature of execution can
issue for the enforcement of such claims.34 No original jurisdiction
exists in the supreme court in regard to claims against the state
except as above set forth. In a number of cases coming before the
court on appeal from the guperior court, the question has arisen as to
whether the writ of mandamus could be issued to compel the pay-
ment of a claim against the state. Where the claim has been ascer-
tained and its payment authorized, and the duty of the officer is
purely ministerial, payment may be enforced by mandamus; but
where the authority is not clear or the duty involves discretion, the
writ will not issue, and the claimant must apply to the legislature.3 5
1C. S. 1410.
"Bledsoe v. State, 64 N. C. 392; Clements v. State, 76 N. C. 199; s. c. 77
N. C. 142; Horne v. State, 82 N. C. 382.
"See cases cited in note 32.
3, Const., Art. 4, s. 11; Garner v. Wbrth, 122 N. C. 250, 29 S. E. 364; Blount
v. Simmons, 119 N. C. 50, 25 S. E. 789.
"Bank v. Worth, 117 N. C. 146, 23 S. E. 160, 30 L. R. A. 261 ; Burton v.
Furman, 115 N. C. 166, 20 S. E. 443; Co. Bd. of Education v. State Bd. of
Education, 106 N. C. 81, 10 S. E. 1002; Boner v. Adams, 65 N. C. 639. Where.
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In the case of White v. Auditor,3 6 action was brought in the
superior court for a mandamus to compel the auditor of state to
issue his warrant for the plaintiff's salary as a state officer, and the
case came before the supreme court on appeal. The legislature had
passed an act abolishing the plaintiff's office, substituting other offi-
cers for the performance of the duties, and providing a method for
the payment of salaries. It had been decided that the act depriving
the plaintiff of his office was unconstitutional, and that he was still in
office. The court decided that since the plaintiff was still in office
and it was not the legislative intention to deprive the officer of his
salary, it was a proper case for mandamus to issue, issuing the
warrant being only a ministerial duty and not involving the exercise
of discretion.
87
V. Advisory jurisdiction. While the executive, judicial and
legislative departments of the government are to be kept separate,38
and each department has its separate field of operation, it has some-
times been considered convenient and of great advantage to have the
opinion of the supreme court upon a question of law which might
arise either in the executive or legislative departments. In such cases
the facts are presented giving rise to the question of law, and the
court is requested to give its opinion, not as a judicial determination
of the question, but in an advisory capacity. There is no authority
to give such advice voluntarily, nor is it an official obligation, but it
may be exercised upon request, out of courtesy and respect. The
opinion of the court is not a final judicial determination, but it is
presumed that if the question should later arise, the court would
adhere to its opinion. This advisory power has been exercised in a
a few cases upon important public questions.39
Where a case comes before the court in such a manner that it
cannot proceed to a final determination of the question involved, the
costs had been taxed against the state and the validity of the claim had been
ascertained, the remedy of the claimant was to apply to the legislature for
payment. Garner v. Worth, 122 N. C. 250, 29 S. E. 364.
$-126 N. C. 570, 36 S. E. 132, growing out of one of the "office holding
cases," White v. Hill, 125 N. C. 194, 34 S. E. 432.
" The decision was by a divided court, and impeachment proceedings were
instituted against two of the majority justices, the third having died, on the
ground that the court had exceeded its authority and had invaded the province
of the legislature in regard to claims against the state. The impeachment
was not sustained. See Impeachment Trial, Public Documents, 1901.
"Const., Art. 1, s. 8.
'31 N. C. 516, qualification of voters; 64 N. C. 785, legislative term of
office; 120 N. C. 623, the lease of the N. C. R. R.
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case will be dismissed; but the court may, if the matter is one of
public interest, express an opinion upon the law in question, in the
exercise of its advisory power. In a "case agreed" in the superior
court, to test the validity of a statute regulating preferences by
mortgage, it was, held on appeal that the facts stated were not suf-
ficient for the court to render a final judgment, and the case was
dismissed; but because it was a question of general public importance
the court proceeded to construe the statute.40 In an action in the
supreme court against the state for breach of contract for public
printing, it was held that the action could not be maintained, and the
case was dismissed; but the question being one of public interest,




1. Statutory period. From its organization in 1818 up to 1868,
the jurisdiction of the court was statutory, and its chief function
was as a court of review. The statute provides that the court shall
have jurisdiction "to hear and determine all questions at law, brought
before it by appeal from a superior court of law, and to hear and
determine all cases in equity, brought before it by appeal from a
court of equity, or removed there by the parties thereto, and in every
case the court may render such sentence, judgment and decree, as on
inspection of the whole record it shall appear to them ought in law
to be rendered thereon. 42
Under this statute there were three ways in which a case, which
had been brought in the superior court, could be heard in the su-
preme court. On appeal from a judgment in a case at law, at
common law, the ordinary method of reviewing the action of a lower
court was by writ of error, based upon the rulings of law in
the lower court. Under the statute, such review was called an appeal,
and it was heard in the same manner as if a writ of error had been
issued, that is, upon exceptions to the ruling of the court upon
matters of law. 43 In a case tried in the superior court as a court of
equity, an appeal was taken to the supreme court, and this carried
the whole case up for review upon the law and the evidence, as it
had been heard in the lower court. This was in accord with the
"Farthing v. Carrington, 116 N. C. 315, 22 S. E. 9.
4 Stewart v. State, 118 N. C. 624, 24 S. E. 114.
"Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 6; Rev. Code, ch. 33, sec. 6.
" Rush v. Steamboat Co., 68 N. C. 72.
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regular practice in the English court of chancery. The court of
equity was not a jury court, but the judge heard the evidence, which
was all in writing, found the facts and rendered the decree thereon.
The appellate court, therefore, had the whole case before it, and
could review the facts as well as the law.4 4 When a case pending in
the superior court as a court of equity was ready for a hearing, it
could be removed to the supreme court on motion and sufficient cause
shown, and it was there heard and determined as it would have been
in the lower court.4 5 By express provision of the statute, the appel-
late jurisdiction was limited to the review of cases coming from the
superior court. An appeal could be taken, as a matter of right, from
any final judgment or decree of such court; but it was within the
discretion of the superior court to allow an appeal from an inter-
locutory order.
46
On appeal from the superior court, the supreme court could
render such sentence, judgment and decree as on an inspection of
the whole record, it should appear to them ought in law to be rend-
ered; and the consent of the parties could not authorize the court to
render any judgment except what ought to have been rendered in
the superior court.47 On appeal from an interlocutory order or
judgment, the court could not render a judgment reversing or modi-
fying the judgment or order appealed from, but certified its opinion
to the lower court with instructions to proceed in accordance with
such opinion.
48
2. Constitutional period. Under the Constitution adopted in
1868, it is provided that "the supreme court shall have jurisdiction
to review, upon appeal, any decision of the courts below, upon any
matter of law or legal inference." 4 9 The jurisdiction is thus fixed
by the fundamental law and is not subject to legislative change.
a. Extent of jurisdiction. The power "to review, upon appeal"
has been construed to be the same as that existing under the former
law, constituting this a court of error, having all the power which
4" Jones v. Boyd, 80 N. C. 258; Long v. Holt, 68 N. C. 53; Graham v..
Skinner, 57 N. C. 94.
"5 Rev. Stats., ch. 32, s. 16; Rev. Code, ch. 32, ss. 20, 21; Littlejohn v. Wil-
liams, 17 N. C. 380; Lee v. Norcom, 16 N. C. 372.
"Rev. Stats., ch. 4, ss. 21, 22, 23; Rev. Code, ch. 4, ss. 21, 22, 23; McKenzie
v. Little, 31 N. C. 45; Morrison v. McElrath, 20 N. C. 612.
T Rodman v. Davis, 53 N. C. 134; Bethea v. McLennon, 23 N. C. 523.
"Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 11 ; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 14.
" Const., Art. 4, s. 8.
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a court of error had at common law.5 0 The only way in which the
power may be exercised is by appeal from a lower court, or by some
proceeding as a substitute for an appeal, in the exercise of super-
visory power. 51 What particular questions may give the parties the
right of appeal and require the consideration of the appellate court
will come more properly under the subject of procedure on appeal.
The right to review "'decisions of the courts below, upon any matter
of law or legal inference" would necessarily include all final judg-
ments and decrees, as under the former statute. The jurisdiction
is broader than that, but there must be some ruling of the lower
court, upon a matter of law or legal inference, before a review may
be had.5 2
While there is no reference in the Constitution to the power of
the court to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order, as under
the former statute, the words are broad enough to include this, and
such has been the legislative and judicial construction. An appeal
may be taken from any order or determination of the court, involv-
ing a matter of law or legal inference, which affects a substantial
right of the parties;58 but not when such orders are within the
discretion of the court, unless it appears that such discretion was
abused or that the ruling was based upon a matter of law.54
b. Law and fact. Under the former practice, when law and
equity were administered by the same court but under different
systems, the right of review in cases at law was limited to questions
of law, while in equity cases both the law and the facts were
reviewed. The Constitution provides for a review of matters of
law or legal inference, abolishes the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity,5 5 and originally provided that no issues of
fact should be tried before the supreme court.58 The distinction
'between law and equity was not abolished, in that the remedies
remained as before, but such remedies were to be sought in the same
'Murrill v. Murrill, 90 N. C. 120; Rush v. Steamboat Co., 68 N. C. 72.
"State v. Webb, 155 N. C. 426, 70 S. E. 1064; James v. R. R., 123 N. C.
299, 31 S. E. 707; Murrill v, Murrill, 90 N. C. 120; nor can the consent of the
parties confer jurisdiction, Belden v. Snead, 84 N. C. 243.
"State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 509, 80 S. E. 72; Tyson v. Tyson, 100
N. C. 360, 6 S. E. 707; Sheppard v. Bland, 87 N. C. 163; Foushee v. Pattershall,
67 N. C. 453.
SC. S. 638, 1413; Merrill v. Merrill, 92 N. C. 657.
"Long v. Gooch, 86 N. C. 709, and cases cited.
Const., Art. 4, s. 1.
Const. of 1868, Art. 4, s. 10.
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court and in the same mode of procedure. 57 The question arose as
to whether these provisions limited the appellate jurisdiction of the
court to matters of law, as in cases at law under the old practice,
and excluded any review of facts in cases which would have formerly
been in equity.
In cases of a legal nature it is evident that no change in the
practice was intended. The review in such cases is always upon
matters of law arising upon the facts found by the lower court,
either by the verdict of a jury or by the judge, and there is no power
"to review, change, or modify in any respect the findings of fact by
the court below."58 In cases of an equitable nature the question is
more difficult.
In Heilig v. Stokes,59 the first case in which the question arose,
the appeal was from an order of the lower court refusing to vacate
a temporary injunction, and it was contended that since the judge
below based his ruling upon the facts in issue, it would be necessary
to review the facts, and that the appellate court had no power over
issues of fact. The court makes the distinction between "issues of
fact," or such facts as are put in issue by the pleadings, and "ques-
tions of fact," or facts which arise incidentally in the progress of
the trial, and holds that the constitutional provision applies only to
"issues of fact" in the technical sense. In a later case e° it was held
that in "issues of fact" arising upon the pleadings in an equity case,
the parties were entitled to a jury trial unless the right was waived-
In Keener v'. Finger,61 which was an action for an account and set-
tlement by an administrator, the court was asked to review the find-
ings of fact made by the judge below upon exceptions to a referee's
report. The court says, "We are of the opinion that the Consti-
tution does not confer such jurisdiction upon this court; on the
contrary, we are of the opinion that it is expressly prohibited..
The manifest purpose of the Constitution is to take from the
supreme court, as constituted under the new system, the jurisdiction,
which it had under the old order of things to try all equity cases,
both law and fact, upon appeal or by transfer from the superior
courts."
" Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N. C. 22.
" Harriss v. Sneeden, 101 N. C. 273, 7 S. E. 801; Coates v. Wilkes, 92 N. C.
376; Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500; Greensboro v. Scott, 84 N. C. 184.
" 63 N. C. 612; see also Foushee v. Pattershall, 67 N. C. 453.
Armfield v. Brown, 70 N. C. 27.
'70 N. C. 35, see dissenting opinion of Rodman, J.
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Following the decision of Keener v. Finger, in 1874, the Con-
stitution was amended in 1875 by striking out the clause, "no issues
of fact shall be tried before this court," and substituting the present
provision, "the jurisdiction of the court over 'issues of fact' and
'questions of fact' shall be the same exercised by it before the adop-
tion of the Constitution of 1868."62 This amendment was first con-
strued in Jones v. Boyd,63 and it was held that the distinction be-
tween "issues of fact" and "questions of fact," as made in Heilig v.
Stokes, is removed and the jurisdiction over both is restored as it
existed before 1868. The court does not, in this case, attempt to
define the limits of such jurisdiction, and this was done in subsequent
cases.
In Worthy v. Shields,64 the plaintiff brought his action to recover
land, and alleged an equitable right to redeem under a mortgage.
The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations, and asked to have
the issues of fact submitted to the jury. The judge declined to
submit the issues, on the ground that the case was equitable in its
nature and that it was the duty of the court to hear and determine
the facts, as under the former practice. On appeal it was held that
the parties had the right to have the issues of fact in an equity case
tried by a jury, and with the same effect as in a case at law. The
power of the appellate court to review the facts is limited to matters
exclusively of equitable cognizance under the former system; and
in such cases only when the evidence is written and documentary,
so that the higher court is in the same position as the court below.
In Coates v. Wilkes,6 5 the court clearly defines the power of
review. "While the legislature has not undertaken to provide how
the facts in actions and matters purely equitable in their nature shall
be ascertained, otherwise than as in actions where the matter in
litigation is purely legal in its nature, it is settled that in equitable
matters wherein the evidence is and must be written in the form of
affidavits, or depositions, or is documentary, and the court below
finds the facts, this court has authority, and it is its duty in a proper
case, upon appeal, to consider the evidence before that court, review
its findings of fact, and sustain, reverse or modify them. It has
uniformly done so since the amendment of the Constitution in 1877,
"Const., Art. 4, s. 8; C. S. 1411.
U80 N. C. 258.
"90 N. C. 192.
"92 N. C. 376.
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in applications for injunctions, receivers and like applications wholly
equitable in their nature, wherein questions of fact, as distinguished
from issues of fact, have been passed upon by the superior court."
It is also held that the court cannot review the evidence and findings
of fact in cases purely equitable, where issues of fact are tried by a
jury.68 The power to review the facts being limited to equity cases,
it can not be exercised unless the case is exclusively equitable, and
the written evidence is sent up, and not the substance of it.y7 It
has been held not to apply to a partition proceeding, because that is
not exclusively equitable ;68 nor to a proceeding for contempt ;69 nor
in an equity case where the facts have been found by the verdict
of a jury.
70
c. Judgment rendered. It is provided in the statute that "in
every case, the court may render such sentence, judgment and decree,
as, on inspection of the whole record, it shall appear to them ought
in law to be rendered thereon."7 1 The appellate jurisdiction in a par-
ticular case being derivative and not original, it must appear from
the record that the case was properly constituted in the lower court,
and what action of the lower court is the subject of review. Where
the record fails to show that any court was held, or that any judge
was present, or gave any judgment, or what particular matters the
court below was called upon to adjudicate, the appellate court can-
not proceed to judgment.72 It must also appear from the record
that the decision of the lower court was in a real controversy between
the parties, in which the court had duly considered and decided the
questions involved, and not a pro forma judgment to which the
parties had submitted and then appealed, in order to "feel their
'The limitation thus defined has been consistently followed. Howard v.
Bd. of Education, 189 N. C. 675, 127 S. E. 704; Cameron v. Highway Comm.,
188 N. C. 84, 123 S. E. 465; Power Co. v. Power Co., 171 N. C. 248, 88 S. E.
349; Harvey v. R. R., 153 N. C. 567, 67 S. E. 627; Travers v. Deaton, 107 N. C.
500, 12 S. E. 373; Roberts v. Lewald, 107 N. C. 305, 12 S. E. 279; Taylor v.
Pope, 106 N. C. 267, 11 S. E. 257, 19 A. S. R. 530; Battle v. Mayo, 102 N. C.
413, 9 S. E. 384; Fortune v. Watkini, 94 N. C. 304; Runnion v. Ramsay, 93
N. C. 410.
Gatewood v. Burns, 99 N. C. 357, 6 S. E. 635.
' Simmons v. Foscue, 81 N. C. 86.
Young v. Rollins, 90 N. C. 125.
"Wessell v. Rathjohn, 89 N. C. 377, 45 A. R. 696; Leggett v. Leggett, 88
N. C. 108; Shields v. Whitaker, 82 N. C. 516.
'Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 6; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 6; C. S. 1412.
"State v. Preston, 104 N. C. 733, 10 S. E. 84; Broadfoot v. McKeithan, 92
N. C. 561; Markham v. Hicks, 90 N. C. 1; Logan v. Harris, 90 N. C. 7; Gordon
v. Sanderson, 83 N. C. 1.
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way" in cases of doubtful litigation;73 nor will the court proceed
when there is only a fictitious issue or "moot question" presented,
upon which it is desired to obtain the opinion of the court.74
Since the power of the court to render such judgment as it
appears upon the record ought in law to be rendered, was statutory
under the former system, and no such power was expressly given
in the Constitution, it was contended that the court could only affirm
the action of the lower court or, if error was found, remand the
case for further action, and could not proceed to render any other
judgment. It was held, however, that the same power existed as
before; since the appeal, in the nature of a writ of error, gave the
court the power not only to reverse a judgment from which a de-
fendant appealed, but also to render judgment for the appellant in
a proper case or direct the lower court to do so, where the court
below had failed to render a correct judgment.75
The power to render judgment is as a court of review, and notice
is taken only of such matters as appear upon the record, such as
the process, pleadings, verdict and judgment, and the court corrects
errors appearing therein and renders such judgment as the lower
court should have rendered. Errors not appearing upon the record,
as those occurring during the progress of the trial, will not be noticed
unless specially called to the attention of the court.76 The errors
which usually appear upon the record and are to be noticed by the
court ex nwro motu are that the court has no jurisdiction, that the
complaint does not state a cause of action, or that the facts found do
" Kistler v. R. R., 170 N. C. 666, 79 S. E. 676; Overman v. Lanier, 156 N. C.
537, 72 S. E. 575; Bd. of Education v. Kenan, 112 N. C. 566, 17 S. E. 485 ;
Hines v. Hines, 84 N. C. 122; State v. Locust; 63 N. C. 574.
"Burton v. Realty Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3; Lumber Co. v. Valentine,
179 N. C. 423, 102 S. E. 774; Kistler v. R. R., 164 N. C. 365, 79 S. E. 676;
Parker v. Bank, 152 N. C. 253, 67 S. E. 492; Blake v. Askew, 76 N. C. 325.
Rush v. Steamboat Co., 68 N. C. 72; Mining Co. v. Mills Co., 181 N. C.
361, 106 S. E. 216; Chavis v. Brown, 174 N. C. 122, 93 S. E. 471; Railroad
Connection Case, 137 N. C. 1, 49 S. E. 191, 15 A. S. R. 636; Bernhardt v.
Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 710, 24 S. E. 527, 36 L. R.k A. 402. The statute, C. S.
1412, was in Rev. Stats. and Rev. Code, but was not in the original Code of
Civil Procedure nor in Battle's Revisal. It was brought forward in The Code
of 1883 and in the Revisal of 1905. The regulation in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure is in C. S. 658.
" Wyne v. R. R., 182 N. C. 253, 109 S. E. 19; Kimbrough v. R. R., 182 N. C.
234, 109 S. E. 11; McKinnon v. Morrison, 104 N. C. 354, 10 S. E. 513; Thorn-
ton v. Brady, 100 N. C. 38, 5 S. E. 910; Duvall v. Rollins, 71 N. C. 218.
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-not justify the judgment rendered.77 When the appeal is from an
interlocutory order, the whole cause does not come before the court,
.and the decision is certified down to the lower court, to be pro-
ceeded with there in accordance with the ruling of the appellate
court.
7 8
d. Enforcement of judgment. The court has the power to
issue execution for the enforcement of its judgments, and may, in
its discretion, make such writs returnable before the superior court.
In such case the judgment is certified down and the lower court may
issue further process necessary to its enforcement.79 This was the
practice under the former statute, and it was held that an appeal
to the supreme court from a final judgment carried the whole case
-up; the judgment of the appellate court was final, and any execution
to enforce it should issue from the supreme court, except for costs
in the lower court.80 Although the case may be certified down to
the superior court, the costs of the supreme court are enforced by
execution from that court alone.8 '
e. Decision and opinion. The decision of the court is the judg-
ment of the court upon the questions presented and considered; the
opinion of the court is the written statement of the reasons upon
which the decision is based. There can be but one decision or judg-
ment, while there may be several opinions in the same case.82 There
is no rule fixed by law determining what number of justices must
concur in rendering a decision, so that the general rule of a majority
controls.88 Since three of the justices constitute a quorum, the
concurrence of two of these, when three are sitting, would be the
decision of the court, although it is by less than a majority of the
-whole court. The decision must be the result of deliberation as a
court, and not the opinion of each member separately, although the
opinions might be the same. When in the hearing of a case, the
" Wilson v. Lumber Co., 131 N. C. 163, 42 S. E. 565; Peacock v. Stott, 104
N. C. 154, 10 S. E. 456; Norris v. McLam, 104 N. C. 159, 10 S. E. 140; Mor-
rison v. Watson, 95 N. C. 4'9.
" C. S. 1413, which is the same as under the former practice. Rev. Stats.,
th. 33, s. 11; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 14. Perry v. Tupper, 71 N. C. 380.
0 C. S. 1412.
" Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 6; Grissett v. Smith, 61 N. C. 297; Cates v. Whit-
field, 53 N. C. 266.
"Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 21; C. S. 1417; Rules of Court, 50, 51; Midgett v.
Vann, 158 N. q. 128, 73 S. E. 801; Johnston v. R. R., 109 N. C. 504, 13 S. E.:881.8 State v. Ketchy, 71 N. C. 147; 7 R. C. L. 1015.
"State v. Lane, 26 N. C. 434.
20 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court should, for any reason, be equally divided, the judgment of
the lower court will be affirmed, because there is no decision by a
majority changing the ruling from which the appeal was taken.
This is the decision of the court, effective so far as the particular
case is concerned as if there had been unanimous concurrence, but
it is not to be considered a precedent to bind the court under the
doctrine of stare decisis, if the question should again arise.84
When the power of the court was statutory, prior to 1868, it was
required to "deliver opinions in writing, with the reasons at full
length upon which they are founded."8' 5 This was intended to pre-
vent per curiam decisions, in which the result was declared without
any discussion or explanation of the reasons for reaching it. When
the written opinions were to be filed, they could be prepared by one
justice for the court, but in many cases all the justices filed opinions,
even when the decision was unanimous, or the court was equally
divided.8 6 When the court was made constitutional, the statutory
regulation that the judgments and opinions should be delivered in
writing, was continued, but the words "with the reasons at full
length upon which they are founded," were omitted. In 1893, the
statute was amended, giving the discretion to write the opinions in
full in cases in which the court deemed it necessary.8 7 While the
statute gives the discretion, it has been held by the court that, with-
out such statute, the discretion existed by reason of the constitu-
tional right to make its own rules of practice. 88 In a per curiam
decision or in one affirming the lower court by reason of a divided
court, the justices may file opinions expressing their individual
views, but these do not constitute the ruling of the court. The
same is true in filing concurring or dissenting opinions.80 The only
case in which the court will not exercise its discretion to write an
opinion is when a new trial is granted for newly discovered evidence,
"Jenkins v. Lumber Co., 187 N. C. 864, 123 S. E. 82; McCarter v. R. R.,
187 N. C. 863, 123 S. E. 88; Miller v. Bank, 176 N. C. 152, 96 S. E. 977; Ward
v. Odell, 126 N. C. 946, 36 S. E. 194; Durham v. R. R., 113 N. C. 240, 18 S. E.
208.
8 Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 13; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 16.
"Miller v. Bank, 176 N. C. 152, 96 S. E. 977; State v. Ketchy, 71 N. C. 146.
C. S. 1416; Hyder v. Henderson County, 190 N. C. 664, 130 S. E. 497;
Skipper v. Lumber Co., 158 N. C. 322, 74 S. E. 342; Bradsher v. Cheek, 112
N. C. 838, 17 S. E. 533.
86 Const., Art. 4, s. 12; State v. Council, 129 N. C. 511, 39 S. E. 814.
" Miller v. Bank, 176 N. C. 152, 96 S. E. 977; Thomas v. Fulford, 117 N. C.
667, 23 S. E. 635, in which there was the leading opinion of the court, and also
two concurring and two dissenting opinions.
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because this involves only a matter of discretion and not a matter of
law.9 0
f. Effect of decision. While the decision of the appellate court
is absolutely controlling upon the action of the lower court, it also
fixes "the law of the ease" in the supreme court. When the supreme
court has decided the case and the decision has been certified to the
superior court, its jurisdiction over the case is at an end. The "legal
link or string" which brought the case up for review is broken, and
the case goes "back home" to the superior court, to be there pro-
ceeded with in accordance with the decision of the appellate court.9 '
When the case has been heard and determined and the term has ex-
pired, the jurisdiction is ended, and the case will not be again con-
sidered upon a second appeal upon the same question ;92 nor by a
motion to modify the decision ;93 nor by a motion to reinstate the
case when it has been finally decided ;94 but when an appeal has been
dismissed for failure to comply with some rule of court, or for
excusable neglect, it may be reinstated upon proper application. 95
The court has the power to correct its records, even after the
decision has been certified to the superior court, or at a subsequent
term, so as to show correctly what was done; as when the entry
made was "reversed" when it should have been "affirmed" or "re-
manded," and the like.9 6 This correction may be made by the court
ex mero motu, or upon motion by the party affected, and notice
should 'be given of the correction; but it should appear clearly that
' Crenshaw v. Street Ry. Co., 140 N. C. 192, 52 S. E. 731; U-erndon v.
R. R., 121 N. C. 498, 28 S. E. 144.
'91 aInes v. R. R., 123 N. C. 299, 31 S. E. 707; Davis v. Lumber Co., 190 N.
C. 873, 130 S. E. 156; Ray v. Veneer Co., 188 N. C. 414, 124 S. E. 756; R. R.
v. Horton, 176 N. C. 115, 96 S. E. 954; School Directors v. City of Asheville,
137 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 279; Finlayson v. Kirby, 127 N. C. 222, 37' S. E. 223;
Hastings v. Foxworthy, 45 Neb. 676, 63 N. W. 955, 34 L. R. A. 321, and note;
White v. Butcher, 97 N. C. 8, 2 S. E. 659.
2 Strunks v. R. R., 188 N. C. 567, 125 S. E. 182; Ray v. Veneer Co., 188
N. C. 414, 124 S. E. 756; Holley v. Smith, 132 N. C. 36, 43 S. E. 501; Kramer
v. R. R., 128 N. C. 269, 38 S. E. 372.
" Nelson v. Hunter, 145 N. C. 335, 59 S. E. 116; Bernhardt v. Brown, 118
N. C. 700, 710, 24 S. E. 527, 36 L. R. A. 402; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 321,
24 S. E. 746; Moore v. Hinnant. 90 N. C. 163.
Bowen v. Fox, 99 N. C. 127, 5 S. E. 437.
91 C. S. 600, 1418.
'Durham v. Cotton Mills, 144 N. C. 705, 57 S. E. 465, 11 L. R. A. N. S.
1163; State v. Marsh, 134 N. C. 184, 47 S. E. 6, 67 L. R. A. 199; Scroggs v.
Stevenson, 108 N. C. 260, 12 S. E. 1031; Cook v. Moore, 100 N. C. 294, 6 S. E.
795, 6 A. S. RL 587.
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such mistake was made, since the record imports absolute verity.97
Under the former statutory jurisdiction, it was held that the su-
preme court had no power to issue a writ of error either to the
lower court or to correct its own judgments ;98 nor could a bill of
review be filed to correct a decree in this court ;99 but the statute of
1854 provided that bills of review and writs of error might be
brought within two years, in the supreme court, for any error
apparent in the final decree or judgment of that court. 100 Such
practice does not exist under the present system, and the only remedy
to bring the case again before the court is by a petition to rehear.
This right existed under the former statute and is now regulated
by statute and by rules of court.' 0 '
g. Stare decisis. Adherence to precedent, stare decisis et non
quieta movere, is a binding principle of judicial decisions, that when
a point has been once settled by judicial determination, it forms a
precedent for the guidance of the court in similar cases. This policy
is adopted to give certainty, uniformity and stability to the law, and
to inspire confidence in the courts that principles of law once fixed
will not be readily changed.102 This is to be distinguished from
certain other terms of somewhat similar import. "The law of the
case," as explained in discussing the effect of a decision of the court
in a particular case, is that the court, having heard the question
once, will not again hear the case upon the same point. This is
intended to prevent repeated hearings of the same case, and the
"Summerlin v. Cowles, 107 N. C. 459, 12 S. E. 234, and cases cited in
note 96.
"Smith v. Cheek, 50 N. C. 213; Binford v. Alston, 15 N. C. 351.
"Bible Society v. Hollister, 54 N. C. 10.
I Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 19; Kincaid v. Conly, 62 N. C. 270.
'Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 18; C. S. 1419; Rules of Court, 52, 53; Herndon v.
Ins. Co., 111 N. C. 384, 16 S. E. 465, 18 L. R. A. 547., An illustration of the
present practice may be found in Hunter v. Nelson, 151 N. C. 184, 65 S. E. 909.
This case first appears as Nelson v. Hunter, 140 N. C. 598, 53 S. E. 439, in
which the judgment of the lower court was affirmed; upon a petition to rehear,
144 N. C. 763, 56 S. E. 506, the judgment was again affirmed, a motion was
then made in the supreme court to re-examine the iecord and modify the
decision, and this was denied, 145 N. C. 335, 59 S. E. 116; and then a "bill of
review" was brought in the superior court to correct error of law in the judg-
ment rendered in the supreme court, and this was not sustained. A proceed-
ing to impeach a decree for fraud may be brought in the superior court, after
a judgment rendered in the supreme court. Farrar v. Staton, 101 N. C. 78, 7
S. E. 753; Kincaid v. Conly, 62 N. C. 270.
'"1 Blk. 69; 7 R. C. L. 1000; 15 C. J. 916; 7 Words and Phrases, 1st Series,
6027; 4 Words and Phrases, 2nd Series, 669; Lowdermilk z. Butler, 182 N. C.
502, 109 S. E. 571; Hill v. R. R., 143 N. C. 539, 573, 55 S. E. 854, 9 L. R. A.
N. S. 606.
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ruling of the court may or may not be a precedent for other cases.' 08
Res judicata applies to a particular matter in controversy, that when
it has once been determined between the parties by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, it will not be again considered, except upon
appeal, in order that- there may be an end to litigation.' 0 4 Stare
decisis refers to a particular principle of law decided, while res
judicata refers to a particular controversy between the parties.
Estoppel grows out of the binding force of a judgment upon the
parties thereto, and .prevents their denying its effect when rendered
by a competent court.1 0 5 The doctrine of estoppel does not operate
to prevent a court from overruling a former decision as to a prin-
ciple of law, if it is thought advisable to do so.
While the application of the rule is general and it will not be
departed from unless there is strong reason for doing so, it is not
an inflexible rule, and should not be employed to perpetuate error.
"Precedents are to be regarded as the great storehouse of experi-
ence; not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights
in the progress of judicial investigation."' 0 8  Whether a particular
decision will be followed as a precedent "depends upon the character
of the decision, that is, whether it is sufficiently definitive and pur-
ports to establish a given principle; the nature of the right for which
protection is claimed and whether it was considered and reasonably
relied upon in the case presented, and how far a sound public policy
is involved and must be allowed to affect the question.'
10 7
(a). The court will overrule former decisions when it clearly
appears that the law has been improperly declared.' 08
(b). In questions of common law or equitable principles, it is
usually required that there be a series of decisions, or if one, that it
I School Directors v. City of Asheville, 137 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 279; Mes-
singer v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 56 L. Ed. 1152, 32 Sup. Ct. 739; 3 Words
and Phrases, 2nd Series, 37.10 Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E. 228; White v. Tayloe, 153 N.
C. 29 68 S. E. 907; Bear v. Comrs., 122 N. C. 434, 29 S. E. 719, 65 A. S. R.
711; 7 Words and Phrases, 1st Series, 6127; 4 Words and Phrases, 2nd Series,
298; 15 R. C. L. 949; 34 C. J. 743.
Coltraine v. Laughlin, 157 N. C. 282, 72 S. E. 961; Bear v. Corrs., 122 N.
C. 434, 29 S. E. 719, 65 A. S. R. 711; Gay v. Stancill, 76 N. C. 369; 2 Freeman
on Judgments, 1318.
log Spitzer v. Corers., 188 N. C. 30, 123 S. E. 636; Lowderrnilk v. Butler,
182 N. C. 502, 109 S. E. 571; Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71.
' Williamson v. Rabon, .177 N. C. 302, 98 S. E. 830.
Mial v. Ellington, 134 N. C. 131, 46 S. E. 961, 65 L. R. A. 697, overruling
Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 1, 25 A. D. 677, which had been recognized as the
law for seventy years.
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has been generally recognized and accepted. In conflicting decisions,
the rule does not operate.' 0 9
(c). While no one has a vested right in a judicial decision, when
a single decision or a line of decisions has become the basis of
property rights or of contracts, the court will not generally overrule
them, although a different conclusion might have been reached origi-
nally; and if it should do so, the preexisting rights will be pro-
tected.1"0
(d). When a statute and the decisions are in conflict, the statute
will control; but when a construction of a statute has become the
basis of property or contract rights, a reversal of the decision will
not be retroactive."'
(e). A judicial construction of the constitution may be changed
by a later decision, where it appears that the proper meaning was not
given to the constitutional provision; but vested rights will not be
affected.
112
(f). Dicta. Expressions used in the opinion of the court which
are not necessary to the decision upon the question involved, are
called dicta. If they are used collaterally or by way of argument or
illustration, they are obiter dicta; while if used with reference to a
question presented but not necessary to the decision, they are judicial
' Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N. C. 448, 99 S. E. 401; Williamson v.
Rabon, 177 N. C. 302, 98 S. E. 830, overruling Fuller v. Jenkins, 130 N. C. 554,
in regard to declaring an absolute deed a mortgage; Mason v. Cotton Co., 148
N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 128 A. S. R. 635, 18 L. R. A. N. S. 1221, overruling
Finch v. Gregg, 126 N. C. 176, 35 S. E. 251, 49 L. R. A. 679, in regard to a
principle of commercial lav in the transfer of draft with bill of lading attached;
Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 630, 38 L. R. A. 240, 58 A. S. R. 778,
overruling Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C. 358, 36 A. D. 48, as to the debts of a defunct
corporation.
"Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117, 56 S. E. 693; State v. Bgll, 136 N. C. 674,
49 S. E. 163; Kirby v. Boyette, 118 N. C. 244, 24 S. E. 18, as to the equitable
separate estate of a married woman; Ball v. Paquin, 140 N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410,
3 L. R. A. N. S. 307, following Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 437, and numerous
other cases, in regard to the effect of a married woman's contract, now regu-
lated by the Martin Act, 1911, C. S. 2507; Stern v. Lee, 115 N. C. 426, 20 S. E.
736, 26 L. R. A. 814, as to the effect of the sale of homestead, now regulated
by statute, C. S. 729.
"'Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N. C. 448, 99 S. E. 401; Williamson v.
Rabon, 177 N. C. 302, 98 S. E. 830; Fowle v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639;
Hill v. R. R., 143 N. C. 539, 569, 55 S. E. 854, 9 L. R. A. N. S. 606; Grocery
Co. v. Bag Co., 142 N. C. 174, 55 S. E. 90.
'Mason v. Cotton Co., 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 128 A. S. R. 635, 18 L.
R. A. N. S. 1221; Collie v. Comrs., 145 N. C. 170, 59 S. E. 44, overruling
Barksdale v. Corers., 93 N. C. 472, and Board of Education v. Comrs., 111 N.
C. 578, 16 S. E. 621, 18 L. R. A. 570, as to the constitutional limitation of
taxation.
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dicta. Neither of these will constitute a precedent, but the latter is
entitled to greater weight. 113
h. From what courts appeals may be taken. Under the former
statute the right of review was limited to cases coming only from
the superior court.114  Under the present Constitution, the right of
review extends to "any decision of the courts below," and the statute
describing the jurisdiction uses the same broad terms ;115 but the
general regulations of practice in review contemplate appeals coming
directly from the superior court, and from inferior courts through
the superior court; and in the construction placed upon the Consti-
tution, it has been held that the superior court is the head of the
judicial system below the supreme court, and all appeals from
inferior courts must come through that court. In State v. Spurtin,"8
it is said that the words are broad enough to authorize the legisla-
ture to provide for appeals from other inferior courts, but it has
not done so. In 1895, an inferior court was created for certain
counties and the right of appeal was given from that court directly
to the supreme court; it was held that the act was unconstitutional,
as affecting the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that appeals
would lie only from the superior court.11
7
VII. Supervisory jurisdiction. Under the statutory power prior
to 1868, the court was authorized "to issue writs of certiorari, scire
facias, habeas corpus, mandamus, and all other writs proper and
necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the
principles of law." 118  Except in regard to vacating letters patent,
the jurisdiction was entirely appellate, and the writs were issued for
the purpose of giving effect to its appellate power.
Under the present system, the jurisdiction is constitutional, and
it is authorized "to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a
u Moose v. Corrs., 172 N. C. 419, 433, 90 S. E. 441, Ann. Cas., 1917 E,
1183; Rodwell v. Rowland, 137 N. C. 617, 50 S. E. 319; Kirby v. Boyette, 118
N. C. 244, 24 S. E. 18; Brown v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 78
N. W. 771, 44 L. R. A. 579; Newman v. Kay, 57 W. Va. 98, 49 S. E. 926, 68
L. R. A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39; 15 C. J. 950, 951; 3 Words and Phrases, 1st
Series, 2051; 2 Words and Phrases, 2nd Series, 32. Semble is the term used
with reference to a question which has not been definitely decided, but it is
intimated what the decision of the court would be. Bouvier, 3041.
"'Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 6; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 6.
" Const., Art. 4, s. 8; C. S. 1411.
16 80 N. C. 362.
UTRhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N. C. 650, 29 S. E. 57; Tate v. Corrs., 122 N.
C. 661, 29 S. E. 60; State v. Ray, 122 N. C. 1097, 29 S. E. 61; Pate v. R. R.,
122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E. 334, appeal from railroad commission.
' Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 6; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 6.
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general supervision and control over the proceedings of the inferior
courts."119 This not only gives the power to issue writs to carry
into effect the appellate jurisdiction, as it existed before, but makes
the supreme court the real head of the judicial system, with power
to supervise the inferior courts. The writs which may be used for
either of these purposes are not specifically designated, but whatever
writs could be used under the ordinary common law practice, may
still be used, except as their use may be modified by statute. Some
of these writs, as certiorari and supersedeas, are authorized as here-
tofore in use; the writs of scire facias, mandamus and quo warranto
are no longer used as original writs, but are modified by statute;
the writ of habeas corpus is also regulated by statute; and the writs
of prohibition and procedendo are not mentioned in the statute, but
may still be used in proper cases. 120
rhe power of the court to issue remedial writs is illustrated in
the case of In re Schenck.121 If the court below should refuse to
allow an appeal a certiorari would issue; if it refused to carry
into effect the order of the appellate court, a mandamus would issue;
if it appeared on appeal that a party was unlawfully confined in
prison, a writ of habeas corpus would issue. When the court re-
mands a case to the lower court, a writ of procedendo may issue,
requiring the court to proceed; but in the general practice the certifi-
cate of the decision filed in the lower court is sufficient to require
the court to proceed in accordance therewith without further
order.122 A writ of supersedeas may issue to vacate the order of
the lower court ;i28 and a writ of prohibition may issue only from
the supreme court to restrain an inferior court from proceeding in
a cause beyond its jurisdiction.
124
Certain powers of supervision may also be conferred upon a.
justice of the supreme court, in the nature of original jurisdiction,
as in controlling the exercise of power by election officers, 125 and in
' Const., Art. 4, s. 8; C. S. 1411.
'Certiorari and supersedeas, C. S. 630; scire facias, mandamus and quo
warranto, C. S. 866, 869; habeas corpus, C. S. 2203 et seq.
74 N. C. 607.
t "C. S. 659; Tussey v. Owens, 147 N. C. 335, 61 S. E. 180.
Clegg z. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824; In re Blake, 184 1N. C. 278,
114 S. E. 294; Page v. Page, 166 N. C. 90, 80 S. E. 1060; McArthur v. Timber
Co., 164 N. C. 383, 80 S. E. 403; Arey v. Williams, 154 N. C. 610, 70 S. E. 931.
'State v. Whitaker, 114 N. C. 818, 19 S. E. 3Y6; State v. Superior Court,
40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877, 111 A. S. R. 925.
'McDonald v. Morrow, 119 N. C. 666, 26 S. E. 132.
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issuing writs of habeas corpus. 12 6 The justice in such cases is
acting as a judge with the power conferred by statute, and not as
representing the supreme court.
VIII. Power to make rules. From its first organization the
supreme court has made rules to regulate its practice, and it was also
authorized to prescribe rules of practice for the superior court. The
court, being itself the creature of statute, exercised this power sub-
ject to the legislative will.127 By the Constitution the court is made
an independent branch of the government, and may make its own
rules of practice, free from legislative control. In the constitutional
power conferred upon the legislature to prescribe rules of practice,
this court is expressly excluded; and while the statute still contains
such power, it was carried over from the old statute and is not nec-
essary.128 The rules of court have -been changed from time to time,
but many of them are the same as when first prescribed. They are
mandatory and not merely directory, and have the force of statutes. 129
The power to prescribe rules of practice for the superior court
and inferior courts is vested in the legislature by the Constitution,
and this has been committed to the supreme court by legislative en-
actment. 180 The supreme court may prescribe such rules where
the legislature has failed to do so, and subject to legislative
modification. 1 '
IX. Power to declare a statute unconstitutional. This power
which has given rise to much discussion, and which, since the case of
Marbury v. Madison,3 2 has become a characteristic principle in the
American judicial system, was recognized at an early date in the
courts of this state and has been consistently exercised in numerous
cases. The declaration in the Bill of Rights and later embodied in
the Constitution, that "the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from
C. S. 2208.
Rev. Stats., ch. 33, s. 10; Rev. Code, ch. 33, s. 13; Barnes v. Easton, 98 N.
C. 116, 3 S. E. 744.
' Const., Art. 1, s. 8; Art. 4, s. 12; C. S. 1421; Lee v. Baird, 146 N. C. 361,
59 S. E. 876; Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N. C. 25, 45 S. E. 353; Herndon v.
Ins. Co., 111 N. C. 384, 16 S. E. 465, 18 L. R. A. 547; Rencher v. Anderson, 93
N. C. 105.
' Walker v. Scott, 102 N. C. 487, 9 S. E. 488; Horton v. Green, 104 N. C.
400, 10 S. E. 470, and cases cited in note 128.
' Const., Art. 4, s. 12; C. S. 1421.
'Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N. C. 25, 45 S. E. 353; State v. Edwards, 110
N. C. 511, 14 S. E. 741. The rules of court are found in 174 N. C. 827 and 185
N. C. 787.
' 1 Cranch, 137, 2 U. S., L. Ed. 60.
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each other," has been held not to interfere with the power of the
court to exercise the judicial function to declare the law. In con-
struing the Constitution and statutes, the court is performing a
judicial act and not invading the province of legislation, although the
result of such construction may render a legislative act void.
The question was first presented in 1787, when the powers of
the court were strictly statutory and, therefore, subject to legislative
control. In the case of Bayard v. Singleton, 33 where the question
was as to the validity of a statute, it is said,. "The court, then, after
every reasonable endeavor had been used in vain for avoiding a dis-
agreeable difference between the legislature and the judicial powers
of the state, at length with much apparent reluctance, but with great
deliberation and firmness, gave their opinion separately, but unani-
mously," against the validity of the statute. In State v. Glen, the
court, referring to Bayard v. Singleton, says, "Our predecessors were
the first of any judges in any state in the Union to assume and exer-
cise the jurisdiction of deciding that a legislative enactment was for-
bidden by the Constitution, and therefore null and void."'1 4 The
case which attracted most attention was Hoke v. Henderson, in
which Chief Justice Ruffin wrote the opinion, holding that there was
a property right in a public office and that a statute which inter-
fered with that right was unconstitutional and void. This was recog-
nized as the law in this state for seventy years, until the case was
overruled in 1903.
35
"It is axiomatic that the judicial department of the government
is charged with the solemn duty of enforcing the Constitution, and,
therefore, in cases properly presented, of determining whether a
given manifestation of authority has exceeded the Constitution as
against any legislation conflicting therewith, and it has become now
an accepted fact in the judicial life of this nation."'1 6 In Railroad
v. Cherokee County, the court declares that "when the constitution-
ality of an act of the general assembly is questioned, the courts
'1 N. C. 5.
"t52 N. C. 321. A similar statement is made in State v. Moore, 104 N. C.
714, 10 S. E. 143, 17 A. S. R. 696. About the same time the same action was
taken by the courts in New Jersey and Rhode Island.
15 N. C. 1, 25 A. D. 677, overruled in Mial v. Ellington, 134 N. C. 131, 46
S. E. 961, 65 L. R. A. 697.
"'Iredell, J., in Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 399, quoted by Connor, J., in State
v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S. E. 61, 14 Ann. Cas. 562, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 299.
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place the act by the side of the Constitution, with the purpose and
the desire to uphold it if it can be reasonably done, but under the
obligation, if there is an irreconcilable conflict, to sustain the will of
of the people as expressed in the Constitution, and not the will of
the legislators, who are but agents of the people."
13 7
"T 177 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 758; see also State v. Williams, cited in note 136.
The dissenting opinions of Clark, C. J., who strongly questioned the exercise
of this power, give the reasons against it and the limitations to be observed.
